Operation Bunyan-un-Marsoos and the Balance of Power in South Asia: Pakistan’s Deterrence against Indian Military Escalation
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.63544/ijss.v4i3.172Keywords:
Balance of Power, Deterrence, Escalation, Nuclear Strategy, South Asia, TerrorismAbstract
The purpose of this study was to assess how Operation Bunyan-un-Marsoos affected Pakistan's deterrence posture in South Asia and domestic security, as well as how it interacted with India's military escalation tactics and larger regional security dynamics. Launched in 2017, the operation marked a turning point in Pakistan's counterterrorism efforts, reshaping its deterrence equilibrium and bringing stability back to the country. The introduction highlighted the importance of modernizing deterrence in a nuclearized but conventionally asymmetric South Asia and described the ongoing challenge of striking a balance between external threats and internal security vulnerabilities.
The study adopted a mixed-method approach, combining quantitative analysis of security, military, and nuclear indicators with qualitative review of policy statements and secondary literature from 2016–2023.Results demonstrated that terrorist incidents, civilian and military casualties, and cross-border infiltration cases declined significantly, reflecting the operation’s domestic security dividends. Simultaneously, Pakistan improved its military readiness through enhanced rapid deployment capacity, joint exercises, and armoured modernization, while strengthening nuclear deterrence via missile testing, rhetorical signalling, and progress toward triad deployment. On the regional front, India’s military exercises and ceasefire violations revealed sustained escalation tendencies, yet Pakistan’s global military ranking improved and security partnerships expanded. The study concluded that Operation Bunyan-un-Marsoos provided Pakistan with a strategic window to reinforce deterrence credibility. Future research should investigate how integrated deterrence and evolving regional alignments could mitigate the risks of escalation in South Asia’s volatile security environment.
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Copyright (c) 2025 Muhammad Akif Khokhar, Sajjad, Dr-Zain Ul Abideen, Laiba Hoor, Mushtaq Ahmad, Dr. Muhammad Wajaht Ul Haq

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